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FRAUD ON THE MARKET AFTER 
AMGEN 
JAMES D. COX* 
There are multiple ways investors decide to purchase or sell a 
security. The classic perspective envisions the investor studiously 
poring through complex financial information with the particular 
information relied upon coming from a variety of sources.1 Such 
classical investing, of course, does not require that the investors do 
their own evaluation; they frequently rely on intermediaries such as 
brokers, investment advisors, and even financial columnists. Such 
information mediation is efficient for the classic investor and creates 
the demand side of the burgeoning market for the financial 
intermediaries. Good investment advice leads to the same favorable 
effect as the better mousetrap: The world beats a path to that 
advisor’s door. By whatever method the classic investor uses to be 
informed, what motivates the classic investor is the belief that there 
are opportunities for a reasonable return by the astute deciphering of 
publicly available information.  
A variation of the classic investor model is the professional trader 
that has armed itself with a proprietary algorithm for detecting “buy” 
and “sell” opportunities.2 The inputs to such a model vary greatly and 
may not even include the security’s price, but likely focus on a range 
of other performance data the investor believes predictive of 
performance by the security. To be sure, the professional trader relies 
on publicly available information but not always the same 
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 1.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS passim (5th 
ed. 1951) (describing processes to analyze financial statements and determine intrinsic value of 
shares as prelude to identifying whether a security offers the prospect of a positive return).  
 2.  The professional trader may be guided by a proprietary algorithm keyed to financial 
information regarding the firm or various market developments. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New 
Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 689–93 (2013) (describing the rising role of such traders in 
capital markets). 
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information as the classic investor. Thus, a kernel of information that 
may well be dispositive to the classic investors may not be to the 
professional trader and vice versa.3 
At the other extreme from either the classical investor or 
professional trader is the proverbial dart thrower whose decision to 
purchase or sell is guided not by analysis, but by the fortuity of the 
dart’s path.4 Just why throw darts is an interesting question. Some may 
counsel throwing darts as the natural response/unqualified obeisance 
to the teachings of the efficient market hypothesis: Security prices 
reflect all publicly available information so that it is not possible to 
earn an above average return on the basis of public information. 
Better to read a book than analyze dense financial information; 
knowledge improves the mind, but pursuit of underpriced or 
overpriced securities is not productive.5 
In addition, an ever-growing investment strategy is indexing.6 
Indexers seek to mimic the performance of a particular index, such as 
the Standard & Poor’s Industrial 500. Indexers and dart throwers may 
share a common position: It is not possible to beat the market. 
Whereas the indexer is more systematic in how it responds to this 
believed-reality of the market, the dart thrower is neutral on what the 
proper weight should be for any single stock in her portfolio and 
simply casts her fate to the winds. Indexers may have other reasons 
not to invest classically. Some financial institutions are so large that it 
would be extraordinarily burdensome, practically and financially, to 
 
 3.  See, e.g., GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., 927 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that even though the misrepresentation impacted the price of Vivendi 
shares, the facts that were misrepresented did not assume importance in the professional 
trader’s investment model).  
 4.  See Georgette Jasen, Investment Dartboard: A Brief History of Our Contest, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 7, 1998, at C1 (recounting the extensive history—100 six-month contests—of pitting dart 
throwers against selected analysts, where the dart throwers’ average gain of 4.5 percent fell 
short of the 6.8 percent average gain of the Dow Industrials and the 10.9 percent average return 
garnered by analysts). 
 5.  For example, Brad M. Barber and Douglas Loeffler suggest that the greater return by 
the analysts was due to their selecting riskier securities—adjusted for risk they earned only 4.06 
percent greater than the dart throwers—and likely “piling on” by investors who learned of the 
analysts’ recommendations before the six-month measurement period ended. Brad M. Barber & 
Douglas Loeffler, The “Dartboard” Column: Second-Hand Information and Price Pressure, 28 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 273, 274 (1993). 
 6.  For example, more than one-third of total mutual fund assets and exchange-traded 
funds are passively managed. A Steady Climb for Indexing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2013, at R1. 
These passively managed products have grown at an average annual rate of 26 percent over the 
past seventeen years, twice that of actively managed mutual funds over the same period. 
Rodney N. Sullivan & James X. Xiong, How Index Trading Increases Market Vulnerability, 68 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 70, 72–73 (2012).  
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actively manage all or a substantial portion of their portfolio. The 
costs of active management for all funds would reduce the returns for 
their beneficiaries. Hence, limiting discretionary investing reduces 
overall management costs and enables limited-time investment 
decisions to be more focused.7 The pursuit of an indexing strategy, 
therefore, can be driven by a quest for administrative efficiency and 
not solely by the tenets of the efficient market hypothesis. Indexing is 
also informed by portfolio theory. With portfolio theory, we find that 
the power of an academic theory has cabined resources into clusters 
where aggregate risk is the focus so that the concern is the individual 
security’s impact on overall portfolio risk.8 
A final type of investing is style investing.9 The style investor 
certainly would include indexing but is much broader and variable. 
The pursued style can be the result of a perceived economic trend—
for example, a broadly-based preference of Internet-based companies 
over pharmaceuticals—which can change after a few weeks or 
months, so that later the perceived trend is, for example, extractive 
industries over Internet-based companies.10 Style investing is in a 
sense passive investing, but not in the same way as indexing. Style 
investing entails some cognitive effort to identify the trends. There is 
growing evidence of a “piling on” feature among many institutions, 
i.e., style investing, where we observe that institutions alter their 
investment portfolio so as to mimic the profitable pursuits of earlier 
first-embracers of an economic sector that produced abnormal 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Jason Kephart, Passive Investing: If Its Good Enough for CalPERS…, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 24, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20130324/FREE/130329970# (discussing pension fund giant, CalPERS, which has passively 
invested more than one-half of its $255 billion portfolio). See also Passive Equity Portfolios of 10 
Large Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.pionline.com/ 
gallery/20130325/SLIDESHOW2/325009999 (noting that passive investment for the top five 
pension funds’ equity portfolios was 74 to 93 percent). 
 8.  This in turn can induce further passivity in oversight on the part of such institutional 
holders. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
863 (2013) (noting that portfolio theory has contributed to passive investment practices by 
institutional holders and thereby weakened the value of governance/monitoring rights, such as 
voting, for which activist investors provide something of an efficient antidote).  
 9.  See Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161, 164–66 
(2003) (noting that it is not the prospective cash flows associated with the individual firm, but 
rather the risk-return profile, and other like measures, of a group of firms).  
 10.  For evidence of style investing, see Nicole Choi & Richard W. Sias, Institutional 
Industry Herding, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 480–82 (2009) (documenting evidence of style 
investing); Kenneth Froot & Melvyn Teo, Style Investing and Institutional Industry Herding, 43 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 883, 904–05 (2008) (concluding that evidence of style 
investing tactics was present in investor decisions).  
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returns for the earlier investors. 
In sum, there are a wide range of investment approaches in 
today’s markets. Complementing the above description is that many 
of the investors, not so with the dart thrower and less so for the style 
investor, practice, to some extent, portfolio investing; with portfolio 
investing, the merits of a particular stock are assessed, not by isolating 
that stock’s perceived risk-return, but by assessing how the stock’s 
acquisition or disposition will impact the overall risk-return of the 
investor’s portfolio. For this calculation, the co-movement of the 
individual security to the market, rather than its particular financial 
performance and position, weighs heavily in the investor’s decision 
making. Although the individual firm’s return over time is no doubt 
impacted by the firm’s periodic release of financial information 
regarding its performance, the portfolio investor’s engagement with 
that information is attenuated, as the focus of portfolio investment is 
the co-variance of an individual security’s performance over time. 
Now assume that the classic investor, the professional trader, the 
dart thrower, the indexer, and the style investor each purchased the 
same security, only to learn that its price had been inflated by 
accounting chicanery carried out by nefarious corporate officers.  The 
above-described constellation of investment approaches challenges 
the contemporary heuristic—reliance—for handling causation when 
fraudulent information reaches public securities markets and 
investors collectively seek relief through a class action. To be sure, the 
classic investor can be thought to rely on the fraudulent information, 
albeit more likely indirectly. Whether the professional trader relied 
will depend on whether the model used incorporated the particular 
data, for example a security’s price, that was misrepresented or 
affected by the misrepresentation. There appears to be no basis to 
conclude that the dart thrower, indexer, or style investor relied on any 
information whatsoever. But does the absence of classical reliance 
mean there is also the absence of a claim, or at least one that can be 
prosecuted collectively as a class action? Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds11 brings the Supreme Court closer 
to resolving this question. As will be seen, Amgen houses the dog that 
did not bark. Its most significant contribution is not the issue it did 
resolve; instead, Amgen is the harbinger for the resolution of the most 
significant development for future securities class action litigation—
 
 11.  133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).  
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the viability of the fraud on the market approach to causation. 
I. RELIANCE TO FRAUD ON THE MARKET 
Most securities fraud actions occur under the antifraud provision, 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act). Requiring reliance on the misrepresentation was 
solidified in the antifraud jurisprudence in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,12 
where the Second Circuit reasoned that reliance was necessary “to 
certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.”13 The court observed that if it did not require reliance it would 
be eliminating “the principle of causation in fact.”14 After reviewing 
the extensive trial record, the Second Circuit held that the district 
court properly concluded that the plaintiffs would have sold their 
shares regardless of whether they had known of the omitted facts.15 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have also demanded that causation, 
frequently referred to as transaction causation, be established 
between the misrepresentation and the investor’s decision,16 so that 
 
 12.  340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). There are of course much earlier references to reliance in 
private litigation under the antifraud provision. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 
808, 833 (D. Del. 1951) (allowing suit to proceed because all members of the class relied on the 
defendant’s misrepresentations).  
 13.  List, 340 F.2d at 462. In taking this position, the court liberally invoked the 
Restatement of Torts as well as the leading treatises by Prosser and Harper. Id.  
 14.  Id. at 463.  
       15.    Id. at 464. 
 16.  In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972), the Court broadly 
stated that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, 
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts 
withheld be material.” Taken literally, as many lower courts have, this makes positive proof of 
reliance depend on whether the misrepresentation is a misstatement or omission. This ascribes 
too little weight to the defendants’ egregious misconduct and sympathetic position of the 
plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute. While representing very unsophisticated and obviously dependent 
clients wishing to sell their privately held shares, the defendants failed to disclose that the 
defendants not only had standing orders at prices several times what the defendants purchased 
the shares from the plaintiffs, but also that the defendants thereby were garnering enormous 
profits through their representation of the plaintiffs. Id. at 151–54, 161. Reliance could, 
therefore, be easily presumed under these facts. Id. at 153–54. The Supreme Court has also been 
pragmatic when dealing with transaction causation in the context of aggregate decision making. 
Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. is such a case. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills involved a material 
omission in a proxy statement seeking the approval of the shareholders of a public corporation. 
Id. at 384. As a result of Mills, transaction causation does not require proof of how each 
shareholder would have voted had the omission not occurred; rather, transaction causation is 
established by evidence demonstrating that the defendant lacked sufficient votes to approve the 
transaction under state law. Id. at 384–85. Thus, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1107–08 (1991), causation was lacking because the defendant controlled sufficient 
shares to assure approval of the transaction. However, if the omission prevents the individual 
shareholder from exercising his appraisal remedy, causation is not impacted by the defendant’s 
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transaction causation in some form is above peradventure in private 
antifraud suits. But does such causation require proof the investors 
relied? 
For most investors who purchase publicly traded shares, initiating 
an individual suit is not an option; the recoverable amount is too 
slight to justify the suit’s costs.17 Thus, although the class action is not 
the last resort, it is the only viable option for most aggrieved investors. 
Yet, a single issue stands in the path of investors seeking to join their 
claims: whether proof of individual reliance is required for recovery. 
Because the burden of inquiring whether hundreds, or likely 
thousands, of investors relied on the alleged misrepresentation would 
be overwhelming, the suit could not be certified as a class if the courts 
required each class member to establish his or her reliance on the 
alleged misrepresentation. 
Claims of fraud by numerous investors naturally invite the 
question whether the alleged fraud was causally related to the harm 
investors alleged. As seen, the courts have historically examined this 
connection through the lens of reliance or, somewhat more generally, 
transaction causation. How courts address causation, therefore, 
necessarily implicates whether aggregation of claims is permissible. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s initial engagement of this question for 
fraudulent releases of information in connection with publicly traded 
companies, the lower courts pursued one of three distinct approaches: 
Some courts held that reliance is satisfied due to the proximate 
causation between the misstatement and harm; other courts held that 
reliance requirements should be relaxed because to hold otherwise 
would impose an overly burdensome evidentiary requirement; and, 
most commonly, courts simply combined the two rationales. 
Panzirer v. Wolf18 illustrates the first approach to justifying fraud 
on the market. For simplicity, this approach will be referred to as the 
price distortion justification. Zelda Panzirer, a substitute school 
teacher, while traveling to Vermont with her husband, was attracted to 
a story in the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column that 
 
unquestionable voting power to assure the transaction, because individual, not aggregate, 
decision-making renders causation an inquiry into how the omission or misstatement impacted 
the plaintiff’s resort to appraisal. Wilson v. Great Am. Ind., Inc., 979 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
 17.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 815 
(2013) (noting that numerous court decisions have found that where investors cannot rely on the 
class action device to bring fraud suits, the alternative is not bringing a claim at all).   
 18.  663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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provided an optimistic report on companies that produced 
educational cassettes.19 Two paragraphs of the story were devoted to a 
favorable review of Allied Artists.20 She asked her husband to stop the 
car so that she could call her broker.21 After reviewing the Standard & 
Poor’s Tear Sheets for a few minutes, the broker reassured her that 
there appeared to be no negative news regarding Allied.22 Thereupon 
she purchased 200 Allied shares; later that day she acquired another 
500 shares.23 A few months later, Allied filed for bankruptcy, at which 
time it was discovered that the annual report relied on by Standard & 
Poor’s inflated Allied’s revenues and the auditor failed to qualify its 
opinion regarding Allied’s ability to continue as a going concern.24 In 
certifying the class, the Second Circuit described in great detail a 
prima facie acceptable causal chain: 
[T]he plaintiff argues that if Allied’s report had been accurate, the 
stock analysts interviewed by the Journal would not have 
mentioned the company favorably, the Journal would not have 
devoted two paragraphs to Allied’s prospects in the video cassette 
market, and plaintiff would not have been led by the article to buy 
her stock. Defendants have introduced no evidence to contradict 
this chain of causation. Though, at trial, the validity of the chain of 
causation will be tested, on summary judgment questions about 
this chain of causation must be resolved in favor of plaintiff, who in 
the case of a material fraud on the market enjoys a presumption of 
reliance. Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those 
working in or reporting on the securities markets, and where that 
information is circulated after a material misrepresentation or 
omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the 
misrepresentation or omission.25 
 
 
 
 19.  Id. at 367. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. Similar reasoning appears in Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements. The misstatements may affect the price of the stock, and thus 
defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock’s value.”). See also 
Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
misrepresentation causes harm to the investor “either directly (through actual reliance) or 
indirectly (by affecting the market upon which the party traded)” (citation omitted)).  
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In contrast to the price distortion approach, some early courts 
presumed reliance in part out of evidentiary concerns, fearing an 
inquiry into reliance would not likely be productive while proving an 
unmanageable burden for the litigants and the court. For example, as 
one district court found: 
[W]hile some sort of reliance on the part of the plaintiff still must 
be proved, it appears that reliance of the actual, subjective, 
individual nature necessary in the classical fraud case would 
unnecessarily encumber large 10b-5 actions and thereby thwart the 
Congressional interest in providing a means by which investors 
may recover against market manipulators in federal court. In the 
stock exchange context (as opposed to closely held stock sold and 
purchased in a face-to-face transaction) the interest of Congress in 
seeing that the integrity of the market is preserved is even 
greater.26 
More frequently, both justifications were invoked by the lower 
courts, as illustrated by the “seminal and best known of the ‘fraud on 
the market’ cases”27—Blackie v. Barrack28: 
Here, we eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs prove reliance 
directly in this context because the requirement imposes an 
unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden. A purchaser on 
the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific false 
representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may purchase 
because of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some 
other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition 
that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected 
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly 
on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price 
whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material 
misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof from each purchaser 
that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing 
would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indirect, 
despite the fact that the causational chain is broken only if the 
purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of 
 
 26.  In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Cf. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc. 
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a bidder whose tender 
offer was allegedly thwarted by another’s misrepresentations was excused of proving individual 
reliance on the misrepresentations by the target shareholders because such an undertaking 
would be so burdensome as to be impractical).  
 27.  Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 478 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 28.  524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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the misrepresentation.29 
Fraud on the market ultimately reached the Supreme Court in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson.30 On three occasions over a thirteen-month 
period, Basic stated that it was not aware of any company 
development that would explain the increased trading in its stock, 
even though it was engaged in discussions and negotiations for its 
acquisition with Combustion.31 When Basic ultimately announced it 
would merge with Combustion Engineering, its stock soared. 
Disappointed investors who sold Basic shares in the interval between 
its first denial and the merger’s announcement brought a class action 
alleging the misstatements were materially misleading. Their suit 
would ultimately establish the parameters within which the securities 
class action suit survives, if only barely at times. 
With only six Justices participating, a majority32 held it was 
sufficient that class members alleged they had relied on their belief 
that the security’s price reflected all publicly available information.33 
The Court’s slim majority reasoned “that persons who had traded 
Basic shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set 
by the market.”34 Note here the reliance to be presumed is not on any 
particular information that may have impacted a security’s price, but 
rather that the price of the security is impacted by financially 
significant information. Thus, Basic did not adopt an approach that 
required evidence only that the defendant’s misrepresentation 
impacted the stock’s price and, thus, caused the class members to 
purchase or sell at a price distorted by the misrepresentation. By 
retaining reliance, Basic required more. As will be seen, it is on this 
point that the mischief and difficulty in applying Basic becomes 
problematic. The Court spoke broadly about how prices are formed in 
well-developed markets: 
 
 29.  Id. at 907. See also Shores, 647 F.2d at 479 (Randall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for “partial abandonment of the reliance requirement”); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing the market response to a corporation’s 
misstatements and subsequent investor reliance on the market price). 
 30.  485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
 31.  Id. at 227–28. 
 32.  In Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 n.1 (2013), 
Justice Ginsburg expressly observed in her opinion for the majority that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1, a majority of a quorum of six Justices constitutes a majority opinion of the Court.  
 33.  Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245. The Court also held that the materiality of speculative 
information should be the product of the probability of the event’s occurrence and the event’s 
magnitude. Id. at 231–33. 
 34.  Id. at 245 (emphasis added). 
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The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in 
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s 
stock is determined by the available material information 
regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements 
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers 
do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection 
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock 
in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance 
on misrepresentations.35 
Justice Blackmun further supported the plurality opinion by 
contrasting the different decision-making found in the personal face-
to-face transaction and impersonal market transaction: 
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into the investor’s reliance 
upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information 
by the investor. With the presence of a market, the market is 
interposed between the seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits 
information to the investor in the processed form of a market 
price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the 
valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face 
transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the 
investor, informing him that given all the information available to 
it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.36 
Note that the Basic majority stopped short of saying evidence of 
such a connection satisfied causality, even for the purpose of 
certifying the class. Importantly, the Basic majority observed that the 
presumption of reliance in the first instance was supported, like 
presumptions generally, on “fairness, public policy, and probability, as 
well as judicial economy.”37 To this end, the Basic majority reasoned 
 
 35.  Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). The 
reasoning adopted in Basic was more fully developed earlier in a leading fraud on the market 
case, Blackie. In Blackie, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the investor “relies generally on the 
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has 
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representation underlying 
the stock price whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material 
misrepresentations.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). The court further 
supported its position by concluding that the approach was consistent with the purpose of the 
antifraud statute: to “foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud an 
expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.” Id. See also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 (“In 
an open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding 
of material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on 
the price of the stock as a reflection of its value.”). The Basic Court also believed that fraud on 
the market was consistent with Congress’s intent. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245–46. 
 36.  Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. 
Tex. 1980)). 
 37.  Id. at 245. 
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that presuming reliance was consistent with the broad congressional 
objective of facilitating investor reliance on the “integrity” of 
securities markets and further supported its conclusion on how stock 
prices are formed in well-developed markets.38 As further support for 
presuming investor reliance, the Basic majority invoked the 
contemporary empirical evidence of stock-price formation and the 
related commentary on the implications of that literature for the 
conduct of securities class actions.39 Thus, reliance was initially 
presumed on public policy considerations and then further supported 
by the majority’s understanding of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), the latter of which remains part of the case for the securities 
class action plaintiff. But Basic is opaque on just what it is that 
investors are presumed to rely on in such a well-developed market. 
The Basic majority was clearly influenced by what it believed 
were the insights to be drawn from the EMH, citing at one point to 
works summarizing the tenets of the EMH.40 Broadly stated, the 
EMH holds that publicly available information is rapidly 
incorporated in the price of publicly traded securities. It is safe to say 
that whatever the views of the EMH were when Basic was decided 
twenty-five years ago, today those views are substantially qualified.41 
In light that much ink has been spilled since Basic was decided on the 
relative efficiency of capital markets and, particularly, the descriptive 
qualities of the EMH, it could be argued that Basic requires 
reassessment in light of the growing body of knowledge regarding the 
efficiency of markets.42 
 
 38.  Id. at 246. 
 39.  Id. at 247 n.24 (citing to authorities reviewing studies bearing on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Criticisms challenging the tenets of the EMH abound. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 
41 J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he increase in the amount of information trading does 
not mean that prices are more efficient”); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market 
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (“Thus the results [in this 
article] call into question the theoretical as well as empirical underpinnings of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis.”). Joining the academics is one who has toiled long and well in the markets, 
George Soros. In George Soros, Letters to the Editor: My Market Theory? Forget Theories, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A33, Soros finds that the theory regarding market efficiency 
distorts reality. Simply stated, neither investors nor markets perform in the way suggested by 
the EMH. 
       42.    Indeed, recently the Court agreed to reconsider fraud on the market. See Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (granting certiorari to consider, among 
other things, whether the Court should overrule or modify the holding of Basic insofar as it 
recognizes the fraud on the market theory of reliance); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2013). 
COX 2.4.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  2:45 PM 
12 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
Yet, a broad reassessment appears unnecessary given that the 
overarching tenet of Basic, reaffirmed in Amgen, is irrefutable: Stock 
prices in markets generally respond to public information that is 
financially significant. Instead, the true weakness in Basic is not its 
reliance on a then-developing body of work focused on how securities 
prices are formed, but that the majority extrapolated from that body 
of work a very different insight than the one set forth in the 
hypothesis; the majority used the EMH to prescribe how investors 
interact with securities markets. Simply stated, the weakness of Basic 
is that it drew conclusions from the EMH that are not within the 
prescriptive tenets of the hypothesis itself, regardless of the 
descriptive validity of the hypothesis. The majority erroneously 
invoked the EMH as a description of investor behavior, rather than 
the functioning of markets. An unvarnished application of the EMH, 
however, or some variant of its teachings, would be premising fraud 
on the market solely on price distortion, as did many pre-Basic 
decisions. 
Basic did not abandon reliance, but presumed its presence by 
concluding that investors rely “on the integrity of the price set” in 
“well-developed markets.”43 Because the EMH says nothing about 
what investors in fact do, the link between the EMH and how 
investors act is problematic. And, putting aside the EMH, there is 
little to suggest that investors are so naïve as to believe that materially 
misleading information never, or even seldom, enters into the pricing 
of a security. Fraudulent reporting, even though not epidemic, does 
occur, and with enough frequency to cause less than unquestioning 
faith in financial reporting.44 And, because financial reporting can 
involve material misrepresentations that occur without culpable 
misbehavior, ex ante assumptions about misleading financial 
information must account for misreporting that is the product of 
culpable misconduct, as well as for misreporting that is not, which 
presumably is more prevalent than fraudulent misreporting. Simply 
put, material misrepresentations are a natural feature of the inherent 
imperfections that surround financial reporting such that this is a 
feature of assessing investment risk. Any belief that investors conform 
 
 43.  Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246–47. 
 44.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to 
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2140 (2010) 
(“Fraud distorts prices with some frequency, and no reasonable investor would ever assume 
otherwise by relying blindly on price integrity. Efficient markets price the risk of asymmetric 
information; they do not assume its absence.”). 
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their behavior to the tenets of the EMH—that there is no potential 
for future price movement based on publicly available information—
must confront the reality that investors actively pursue gains based on 
publicly available information, a course of action directly at odds with 
the EMH. Clearly, regardless of the overall predictive quality of the 
EMH with respect to markets, the EMH is not a predictor of investor 
behavior. As such, it is a very slender reed on which to premise a 
presumption of how investors behave. 
Regardless of weaknesses in Basic or the teachings of the EMH, 
lower courts have overreacted to Basic’s holding. They did so by 
restricting fraud on the market to individual securities they believed 
were traded efficiently45 and by imposing a demanding requirement, 
among other conditions,46 that market efficiency requires evidence 
that a firm’s security reflected all publicly available information in 
order for causation to be derived via fraud on the market.47 As a 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(denying class certification due to low turnover of NASDAQ traded shares being inconsistent 
with their being traded in an efficient market); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322, 325 
(5th Cir. 2005) (denying class certification because shares of small-cap firm traded in OTCBB 
were believed not to be traded efficiently). 
 46.  The leading case for such factors is Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 
(D.N.J. 1989). See also Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the 
Cammer factors). For a close analysis of the criteria used by the courts, see generally William O. 
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help us do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 843 (2005). 
 47.  See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2005) (requiring 
evidence that a security’s price responded rapidly to financially significant information); Gariety 
v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367–68  (4th Cir. 2004) (“A reasonable investor will rely 
on the integrity of the market price, however, only if the market is efficient, because in an 
efficient market, ‘the market price has integrity[;] . . . it adjusts rapidly to reflect all new 
information.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good 
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
1059, 1060 (1990))); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., 364 F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n an 
efficient market, it is assumed that all public information concerning a company is known to the 
market and reflected in the market price of the company’s stock.”); No. 84 Employer-Teamster 
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 947 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“[I]n a modern and efficient securities market, the market price of a stock incorporates all 
available public information.” (citation omitted)); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 
F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tock prices reflect all available relevant information about the 
stock’s economic value [in an efficient marketplace].”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that in an efficient market “the investor must rely on the market to 
perform a valuation process which incorporates all publicly available information, including 
misinformation” (citation omitted)); Kowal v. MCI Comm’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[I]n an efficient securities market all publicly available information regarding 
a company’s prospects has been reflected in its shares’ price.” (citation omitted)); Freeman v. 
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The fraud on the market theory rests 
on the assumption that the price of an actively traded security in an open, well-developed and 
efficient market reflects all available information about the value of a company.” (citing Peil v. 
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consequence, the conduct of securities fraud litigation occurs in a 
world with binary markets: those with efficiently-traded securities and 
those with inefficiently-traded securities. This is a condition most 
believe does not exist.48 
Courts have therefore engaged in the quest to identify stocks 
believed to trade in an efficient market. In doing so, they customarily 
refer to the Cammer factors in determining whether to certify a class 
based on fraud on the market. Cammer v. Bloom49 identified the 
following factors to be considered in determining whether the subject 
stock traded in an efficient market: 1) percentage of shares traded 
weekly, 2) number of analysts following the issuer, 3) presence of 
market makers and arbitrageurs, 4) eligibility to enter the SEC’s 
integrated disclosure procedures, and 5) responsiveness of the 
security’s price to new information.50 The most important factor is the 
cause and effect relationship between a company’s disclosures and the 
resulting change in the price of its shares.51 The Fifth Circuit has 
observed that the last factor “goes to the heart of the ‘fraud on the 
market’ theory.”52 The Fifth Circuit’s observation may be a 
masterpiece of understatement: If there is proof of such a relationship 
between information and stock price movement, why should the other 
Cammer factors matter? 
The post-Basic approach to fraud on the market has few, if any, 
supporters.53 In addition to its most striking flaw, asserting that the 
EMH is itself prescriptive of probable investor behavior, it also uses 
 
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 48.  See supra note 41. 
 49.  711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 50.  Id. at 1286–87. 
 51.  Id. at 1291.  
 52.  Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 53.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 899 (2013) (arguing that “the natural outgrowth of the Court’s market-
based approach to securities fraud justifies resolving the tension in Amgen by overruling that 
aspect of the Basic decision which retains a reliance requirement”); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 154 (2009) (“Given the 
majority’s instinct that plaintiffs should be entitled to rely on the integrity of the market price as 
undistorted by fraud, the tool turned out to be both unnecessary and dangerous.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Fisher, supra note 46, at 847 (arguing that during the Internet, high-tech, and 
telecommunications bubble from 1998 to 2001, “courts [did] not produce justice when they 
appl[ied] the efficient market, through event studies, to 10b-5 cases arising out of the bubble”); 
Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and 
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (“[T]he focus of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what determines whether investors were 
justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not the efficiency of the relevant 
market but rather whether a misstatement distorted the price of the affected security.”). 
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the EMH to draw the conclusion that investors rely on information 
through their presumed reliance on security prices. Thus, for an 
investor that does not rely on price, such as an indexer, style investor, 
or one guided by portfolio theory, fraud on the market would not be 
available. For this group, price, and hence price distortion, is not 
believed causally important to their decisions so they are outside 
Basic’s approach to fraud on the market. These conclusions lack 
substantive support. 
Consider that there is a wealth of evidence that investors have 
heterogeneous expectations.54 Thus, in their response to public 
information, investors can be expected to hold different views on the 
significance of the information. In part, this is because they are 
cognitively bound; their individual endowments will bias their 
interpretation and reaction to the information, particularly to 
financial information for which there is always inherent uncertainty as 
to its impact on the future.55 Because there is no reason to suspect that 
such cognition biases point in one direction, they may well not bias 
stock prices, but they can produce a good deal of noise around what 
might be thought to be the likely equilibrium price.56 Yet, security 
prices are noisy and the assumption should be that investors, on 
average, trade with a healthy understanding of the noise that 
surrounds security prices and the sometimes-unreliable nature of 
information that impacts security prices. 
Compounding this problem, lower courts limit fraud on the 
market to securities that meet certain conditions they believe qualify 
a market as efficient. As seen, there is nothing in the EMH that 
describes what investors in fact do. More specifically, there is nothing 
in the EMH holding that investors react differently in trading publicly 
traded stocks that are within the Cammer factors than how they react 
when trading in publicly traded shares of stocks in smaller 
capitalization issuers that do not meet all the Cammer factors. 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price 
Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 252 (1976) (finding that, because investors have such different 
levels of understanding of likely significance of information, it is not reasonable to expect a 
security’s price to transfer information from informed to less informed investors). 
 55.  See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction 
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003) (reviewing why the EMH is likely qualified by 
investors’ heterogeneous expectations, their cognitive biases, and practical limits on arbitrage).  
 56.  See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 738 (2003) (arguing that 
in order to disturb share prices the cognitive biases must be both pervasive and correlated, and 
arbitrage mechanisms must fail). 
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Furthermore, since so much of the fraud on the market litmus test 
turns on evidence suggesting stock prices will respond quickly to 
releases of public information, why should not the focus be on the 
stock’s price response to information of the same import that is the 
subject of the suit? That is, if incorporation of information into a 
security’s price is the standard for fraud on the market, then why is it 
not relevant to testing that condition to examine how the security’s 
price has responded to information believed analogous to the 
allegedly fraudulent information? To the extent Basic rests on 
assumptions about investors, should it not be open for discussion 
whether investors likely believed that information of a certain type 
would, for that security, impact the security’s price? 
II. ENTER AMGEN 
The above-described faults with Basic and its progeny provide 
important background for understanding the true significance of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. In Amgen, the class was composed 
of investors who purchased Amgen shares during a period in which 
Amgen allegedly made several material misrepresentations by failing 
to disclose adverse information about two of its major pharmaceutical 
products, Epogen and Aranesp.57 The issues before the Court were 
whether, as a condition of certification of the class, the plaintiffs 
should be required to establish the materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentations and if the defendant should be accorded the 
opportunity to rebut the assertion of materiality by showing that the 
truth behind each of the alleged misrepresentations had already 
entered the marketplace.58 Defendants predictably wished these issues 
to be part of the class certification decision so as to reduce the 
hydraulic pressure that class certification places on settlement even 
when these issues are unresolved.59 Correlatively, the plaintiffs 
 
 57.  A full narrative of the facts appears in Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen 
Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011). See id. at 1173 (“[A]lleged misstatements and omissions, 
according to the complaint, inflated the price of Amgen’s stock when Connecticut Retirement 
purchased it. Later, corrective disclosures allegedly caused Amgen’s stock price to fall, injuring 
Connecticut Retirement.”). 
 58.  See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013) 
(“The issue presented concerns the requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3) that ‘the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.’”). 
 59.  Id. (“According to Amgen, certification must be denied unless Connecticut 
Retirement proves materiality, for immaterial misrepresentations or omissions, by definition, 
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naturally preferred fewer substantive determinations in the all-critical 
class certification stage. 
Amgen’s significance is not how it resolved these opposing tugs. 
As examined more closely below, four Justices joined Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion holding that a factually-based finding that a 
material misrepresentation occurred is not a precondition to class 
certification.60 The Amgen majority reasoned that, because issues to 
be resolved for certification of the class are whether common 
questions of law and fact predominate, it is not necessary to resolve 
whether materiality exists.61 For the majority, conditioning 
certification on the plaintiffs’ proving materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentation would amount to “put[ting] the cart before the 
horse”;62  if at trial it should be determined the alleged omissions were 
not material, this would be a conclusion binding on all class members. 
Justice Alito concurred, but did so by expressing his interest in 
revisiting the substantive theory on which common questions in 
securities fraud claims depend—the fraud on the market presumption 
of market causation.63 Less cautious were the dissenters, who not only 
believed that proof of materiality was the sine qua non for class 
certification, but openly expressed disapproval of the fraud on the 
market theory.64 Thus, we find in Amgen the dog that would not 
bark—the continuing vitality of the securities class action, though four 
Justices are eager to revisit Basic. 
The majority opinion in Amgen repeatedly references “efficient”65 
and “efficiency”66 when describing the instances in which the fraud on 
the market approach to causation would be allowed. These 
expressions were used to describe the natural incorporation of 
 
would have no impact on Amgen’s stock price in an efficient market.”). 
 60.  Id. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the 
majority opinion. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 64.  Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Though limiting his dissent to whether the 
majority followed “Basic’s dictates,” Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia, 
observes, “[t]he Basic decision itself is questionable,” referring to the only four Justices then 
approving fraud on the market and pointing toward the Amgen majority’s misgivings regarding 
whether market efficiency is, as Basic has been interpreted, to be a binary—yes or no—
question, or whether it “operates differently depending on the information at issue.” Id. Justice 
Scalia separately dissented but joined the part of Justice Thomas’s dissent inviting 
reconsideration of Basic. Id. at 1206.  
 65.  See, e.g., id. at 1190, 1193 (majority opinion). 
 66.  See, e.g., id. at 1190, 1192. 
COX 2.4.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  2:45 PM 
18 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
financially significant information into security prices.67 The 
significance of Amgen is that it moves from this observation to 
conclude that most investors “rely on the security’s market price as an 
unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public 
information.”68 Missing in Amgen is the emphasis present in Basic that 
the critical reliance is that of investors on the market;69 we can 
therefore find in Amgen a subtle shift from the view that some 
markets have characteristics that attract investors’ reliance on 
security prices to a broader view where the focus is on the pricing 
process and investor reliance on that process and not the market as 
such. Moreover, Amgen does not require, as a condition of such 
efficiency, evidence that the security historically reflected all material 
public information.70 This moves the discourse away from the view 
that pricing is binary, where for some securities the stock’s price 
responds to financial information and for other securities there is 
believed to be no such response. 
Amgen moves to the defensible position that stock prices for 
individual securities respond differently depending on the nature of 
the information.71 For a stock to be within the reach of fraud on the 
market, this need not always be the case—but generally. That is, the 
majority expressly recognized that a security could be deemed traded 
in an efficient market if its shares “generally” reflected publicly 
available information.72 Amgen offers the following explanation of 
how the fraud on the market presumption is justified: 
This presumption springs from the very concept of market 
efficiency. If a market is generally efficient in incorporating 
publicly available information into a security’s market price . . . it is 
reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they 
have little hope of outperforming the market in the long run based 
solely on their analysis of publicly available information—will rely 
on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the 
security’s value in light of all public information. Thus, courts may 
presume that investors trading in efficient markets indirectly rely 
 
 67.  Id. at 1192. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“An investor who buys or sells 
stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”).  
 70.  See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1192 (“If a market is generally efficient in incorporating 
publicly available information into a security’s market price, it is reasonable to presume that a 
particular, public, material misrepresentation will be reflected in the security’s price.”). 
 71.  Id. at 1197 n.6. 
 72.  Id. at 1192. 
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on public, material misrepresentations through their “reliance on 
the integrity of the price set by the market.”73 
On the other hand, Amgen does not expressly reject reliance. 
Thus, the Basic mystery continues. Namely, what showing beyond loss 
causation74—the linkage of the misrepresentation to an actual 
economic loss by the investor—is required to invoke fraud on the 
market? The opinion suggests that the Amgen majority’s 
understanding of what constitutes an efficient market is a market that 
regularly reflects publicly available information.75 At a minimum, 
Amgen’s more relaxed view would appear to reject the lengthy list of 
criteria that lower courts have developed as the gateway for class 
certification based on fraud on the market, and it certainly rejects the 
rigid litmus test that fraud on the market is available only for 
securities whose trade demonstrates that all material information is 
rapidly reflected in the security’s price.76 This observation invites 
lower courts to consider what weight to give in those isolated 
instances in which a security’s price does not respond to financially 
significant information: Is the absence of observable price movement 
evidence that the market is inefficient or that an efficient market is 
documenting that the information was not financially significant? In 
all respects, Amgen can be seen as moving the framework of fraud on 
the market closer to what is supported by the efficient market 
hypothesis literature. Simply stated, Amgen invites the testing of 
market efficiency by its tasting—namely evidence of how a particular 
security’s price has responded to financial announcements. 
 
 
 73.  Id. at 1192–93 (emphasis added) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). Central to Amgen’s 
holding is Amgen’s concession that the alleged misrepresentations were public and that its 
securities traded in an efficient market so that “the market for Amgen’s securities promptly 
digested current information regarding Amgen from all publicly available sources and reflected 
such information in Amgen’s stock price.” Id. at 1193. 
 74.  Professor Donald Langevoort reports that at least Justice Brennan, part of the thin 
plurality opinion in Basic, preferred a more permissive approach to causation, in which proof 
that the misrepresentation distorted the security’s price would establish causation without 
inquiry into any form of investor reliance. Langevoort, supra note 53, at 157 n.25. Amgen would 
appear not to change the result in GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 246, 
262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because there was a 
question of fact as to whether the security’s price, even though distorted by fraudulent 
statements, assumed any importance in the investment model used by the plaintiff investor). 
 75.  See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1192 (noting that in an efficient market, all publicly available 
information is generally incorporated into a security’s price). 
 76.   See supra note 35. 
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Earlier, in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton,77 the Court rejected 
the Fifth Circuit’s class certification requirement of establishing 
factual allegations that support the claims of loss causation.78 As in 
Amgen, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, 
reasoned that requiring proof of loss causation as a condition to 
certify the class “contravenes Basic’s fundamental premise—that an 
investor presumptively relies on a misrepresentation so long as it was 
reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction.”79 
However, one can appreciate that following Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Broudo,80 plaintiffs must allege that the misrepresentation 
caused an economic loss; in fraud on the market cases this is 
customarily satisfied with a factual allegation that the security’s price 
changed in connection with the release of corrective or truthful 
information.81 It thus appears that what the defendants sought in both 
Amgen and Halliburton was an opportunity to challenge forensically 
the factual allegations that the material omissions impacted the 
security’s price. In Amgen, because the defendant had conceded its 
stock traded in an efficient market and that the challenged statements 
were public,82 there was little else the defense could raise to prevent 
class certification. Halliburton raised the need to prove loss causation 
at the class certification stage, before making its motion to dismiss—
the customary method of challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
allegations.83 Presumably, it chose to do so believing that a favorable 
resolution was more likely at a hearing of the type customarily held to 
render findings relevant to certifying the class, compared with the 
more sterile, removed process of a motion to dismiss. So viewed, we 
might consider that Halliburton’s impact on the defendant’s arsenal 
and the plaintiff’s victory is merely shifting to a different point in the 
litigation the need to set forth specific allegations of loss. That is, price 
movement is not taken off the litigation or settlement table; price 
movement remains a demanding and frequently mortal requirement 
 
 77.  131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).  
 78.  Id. at 2187 (holding that the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring evidence of loss causation 
as a condition to certifying the class). The Supreme Court, applying similar reasoning to that of 
Amgen, stressed that loss causation did not implicate commonality as does reliance, and thus 
that inquiry into loss causation was not germane to class certification. Id. at 2186. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 81.  See, e.g., Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2008) (dismissing for failure to plead facts establishing loss causation). 
 82.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013). 
 83.  Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2185. 
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of the plaintiff’s case that can be tested as early as a motion to dismiss. 
Securities class action plaintiffs would have suffered a serious loss 
had Amgen been decided differently and the burden placed on the 
class to support a finding that Amgen’s stock price changed in 
connection with the alleged nondisclosures. As seen earlier, Amgen 
was a nondisclosure case.84 Had the plaintiff in such a case been 
required, as a condition to class certification, to prove stock price 
reaction to the alleged misrepresentations, it would likely have been 
unable to comply. This is because a material nondisclosure frequently 
affirms the status quo and thus is not “new” information in the hands 
of investors. Price change would be all the more difficult to isolate 
where, as was the case in Amgen, the effect of the nondisclosure is to 
confirm investor expectations. In this case, the information that is 
released would not be accompanied by any detectable market 
response because it merely repeats what was expected. A 
nondisclosure in a public market is existential: it leaves no imprint on 
the path of a stock’s price. Thus, class actions premised on 
nondisclosure would most certainly have been relics had Amgen been 
differently decided. To be sure, upon disclosure of the omitted facts, a 
market correction would not only bear on the impact of the omitted 
fact, but also serve to confirm the materiality of that earlier omitted 
fact. However, as Halliburton reasoned,85 the defendants may be able 
to argue successfully that the price change that is then observed is 
unrelated to the facts allegedly omitted earlier. Amgen, by holding 
that the focus of the class certification inquiry is whether common 
questions predominate places more weight on the pretrial motion to 
dismiss. 
Price movements of a security can thus assist the overall causation 
inquiry. Both Amgen and Halliburton exclude this information from 
the class certification stage. It should not be overlooked that a key 
step toward resolving causation, and indeed the appropriateness of 
class certification, is determining whether the alleged material 
omission was committed, and if so whether it impacted the security’s 
price so that it affected all class members. Price movement in 
connection with the misrepresentation, or even disclosure of the truth, 
is also relevant to whether the subject security is traded in an efficient 
market so that fraud on the market is available. It is likely more 
 
 84.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 85.  See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. 
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efficient with respect to judicial resources to simply reorient the focus 
to the pre-Basic approaches discussed earlier—particularly, the 
emphasis on price distortion being the lynch pin for causation.86 But if 
that is not to occur, it remains consistent with Basic, Halliburton, and 
Amgen to examine whether, for the individual security, there is a 
record of price sensitivity to information of the order of the alleged 
misrepresentation, which would suggest investors likely relied on the 
security’s price to reflect such information. At the same time, the 
absence of price movement in a nondisclosure case, such as in Amgen 
or even in a misstatement case such as Basic, does not equate to 
inefficiency. Information that is not new to the market cannot be 
expected to move a security’s price. Thus, claims premised on a failure 
to disclose are essentially alleging it was a violation to perpetuate the 
status quo. Similarly, announcements confirming developments for 
which investors had no doubts is not new information at all. In neither 
case would we expect to see a price change. Thus, materiality must be 
resolved on the merits; however, the matter of class certification 
under Basic raises a different question that can be resolved without 
examining only the market’s response to the particular 
misrepresentation. 
III. THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE 
As seen, Amgen and Halliburton each build on Basic. Neither 
Basic nor Amgen permit fraud on the market on proof a security’s 
price was distorted. Instead, each in its own way presumes investors 
rely on security prices reflecting publicly available information. Thus, 
loss causation does not do double duty; a separate allegation of 
transaction causation—reliance on the market—is required. We can 
find in all three decisions the belief that the heart of fraud on the 
market is that security prices impound financially significant 
information as each decision is focused on evidence that a security’s 
price has been impacted by public information. It is on this process 
that investors rely. If the plaintiffs make this showing, fraud on the 
market is available because the security is believed to be traded in 
such a market. Hence, the question: What are the characteristics of 
such a market? 
 
 
 
 86.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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There is an enormous literature examining the broad questions of 
whether, to what extent, and under what conditions markets perform 
in a manner consistent with the EMH. The early empirical studies—
those that formed not just the bedrock of the EMH, but more 
importantly framed the EMH literature relied upon by Basic—
logically began with listed, large-cap companies.87 There are two 
significant reasons why the larger issuers became the dominant focus 
of the research. First, if an investigator wished to test the hypothesis, 
she would intuitively begin by investigating stock prices for large-cap 
companies. It is much more intuitive to hypothesize that the stock of 
such firms trade in markets that have multiple forces that will move 
their prices rapidly to respond to new information; they are deep 
markets that therefore attract institutional investors who demand 
liquidity. And, where the institutions exist, there is a demand curve for 
analysts and research that will guide the institution’s trading. Hence, 
they trade in not just an environment that is informationally rich but 
also in an environment that attracts a crowd eager to arbitrage new 
kernels of information as it becomes available. Second, academics 
follow the wise guidance of Dirty Harry: They know their limitations. 
The life’s milk of the empiricist is the database. Thus, early EMH 
research was guided by firms that were included in such well-
recognized databases as CRSP and Compustat, for which the 
researcher could efficiently extract information to examine stock 
prices in response to public announcements. Thus, the earliest studies 
by Nobel Laureate Eugene Fama had a very limited focus; he 
examined only companies among the exclusive club making up the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average.88 The next wave of work broadened 
the inquiry to include stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange.89 These were the studies that shaped the contemporary 
 
 87.  See generally Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A 
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984). 
 88.  Eugene F. Fama & Marshall E. Blume, Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. 
BUS. 226, 228 (Supp. 1966); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 
34, 45 (1965). 
 89.  See, e.g., William H. Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings 
Announcements, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 67, 70 (Supp. 1968) (sampling annual earnings announcements 
released by New York Stock Exchange member firms); Peter Lloyd Davies & Michael Canes, 
Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Information, 51 J. BUS. 43, 46 (1978) 
(examining stock price responses to “Heard on the Street” column recommendations using a 
sample limited to stocks that were “almost all from the NYSE”); Eugene F. Fama et al., 
Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1969) (limiting 
analysis of stock splits data to firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange); Michael Firth, 
The Information Content of Large Investment Holdings, 30 J. FIN. 1265, 1267 (1975) 
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EMH literature. The literature did not reject the EMH for non-listed 
or small-cap firms; yet, that group of firms was, and largely continues 
to be, ignored. They are also outside the contemporary applications of 
fraud on the market. But need this be the case? 
There is some research on small-cap firms. Not surprisingly, the 
research supports our intuition that the stock prices of these firms are 
responsive to material financial information. That is, to the fraudster 
behind “pump and dump” schemes that plague the small, non-
reporting companies that trade in the “Pink Sheet Market,” a core 
feature of his abusive practice is the circulation of unfounded rumors 
with the intended effect of driving a stock’s price up.90 Because the 
firms are thinly traded, a slight shift in demand has an immediate 
impact on the security’s price, allowing the unscrupulous fraudster 
who planted the rumor to dump his shares at a substantial profit. 
Hence, a study of Pink Sheet traded securities documented that for 
such firms trading jumped dramatically in connection with favorable 
“touting” of the firms.91 Also, the imposition of reporting 
requirements for securities traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin 
Board that improved the quality of disclosures had a positive effect 
on the firms’ shares and improved liquidity for investors.92 Again, this 
is a finding consistent with financially significant information 
impacting security prices, even in small-cap firms. Professor Kate 
Litvak provides an interesting insight, that returns were affected for 
securities traded on the Pink Sheet market by the market’s operator 
assigning classifications based on disclosure practices of the subject 
firm.93 Of particular interest, the assigned designations were based 
 
(investigating the impact of announcements of equity acquisitions with a premium of 10 percent 
or larger in “quoted companies”); R. Richardson Petit, Dividend Announcements, Security 
Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 993, 997 (1972) (analyzing the impact of 
dividend announcements on the stock prices of New York Stock Exchange firms). Cf. Ross 
Watts, The Information Content of Dividends, 46 J. BUS. 191, 197 (1973) (selecting information 
from Standard and Poor's Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices databases 
which identified firms “tend[ing] to be larger and less risky than the average firm”). 
 90.  See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 406–07 (7th ed. 2013) (examining penny stock frauds). 
 91.  Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and 
Corresponding Market Activity 31 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 135), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920553 (explaining that trading activity increased from 4 percent to 70 
percent on a day when touting occured). 
 92.  Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure 
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 257 (2005) 
(noting that many firms chose to avoid the reporting requirements, thus migrating to the Pink 
Sheet market). 
 93.  Kate Litvak, Summary Disclosure and the Efficiency of the OTC Market: Evidence 
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solely on publicly available information, thus suggesting that there 
was information content in the market operator’s judgment regarding 
the disclosure practices of subject firms. Each of these studies of the 
stock prices of small-cap firms challenges the contemporary binary 
approach to market efficiency. Each of these studies shows price-
information correlations consistent with the tenets of Basic and 
Amgen, even though they focus on firms that the courts routinely 
exclude from fraud on the market. 
None of the preceding studies of stock price behavior for small-
cap firms would, pursuant to Basic’s formulation, rebut the 
presumption of investor reliance: 
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. For example, . . . if, 
despite petitioners’ alleged fraudulent attempt to manipulate 
market price, news of the merger discussions credibly entered the 
market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who 
traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would have no 
direct or indirect connection with the fraud. Petitioners also could 
rebut the presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have 
divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the 
integrity of the market. For example, a plaintiff who believed that 
Basic’s statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in 
merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic 
stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless 
because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust 
problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain 
businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a 
price he knew had been manipulated.94 
Moreover, the evidence that prices of small-cap firms move in 
response to securities prices would appear consistent with the 
fundamental criterion that underlies Basic, Halliburton, and now 
Amgen’s fundamental premise—that an investor presumptively relies 
on a misrepresentation so long as it was reflected in the market price 
at the time of his transaction.95 At the same time, passive forms of 
 
from the Pink Sheets Experiment 3, (May 3, 2009) (working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443595. 
 94.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
 95.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).  
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investing, described earlier,96 would appear a basis for removing that 
class of investors from fraud on the market claims since price is not a 
factor in their reliance.97 
As seen, the EMH does not describe how or why investors act as 
they do. Earlier, different types of investment approaches were 
described.98 For some of these approaches, and most clearly for the 
classic investor, there most certainly is reliance on prices in response 
to truthful financial reports. But in today’s market, the image of the 
classic investor is at best quaint and even dated. Today, indexing and 
algorithmic investing are so commonplace such that the bold image 
upon which Basic rests is challenged. It is too easy to dismiss the 
indexer and algorithmic investor as not trading on the basis of 
reliance on price, but other factors. They each may be seen as little 
more than a dart thrower whose aim is driven by a heuristic, albeit 
one not premised on price. As such, they would appear to fall within 
the above-quoted dicta of Basic regarding grounds for rebutting the 
presumed reliance.99 
It is here that the role of presumption comes into the analysis. The 
foundation of Basic was not obeisance to the EMH, but rather Justice 
Blackmun’s reasoning of the useful role of presumptions and what 
considerations justify resort to a presumption: 
Presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing 
circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is 
rendered difficult. . . . Arising out of considerations of fairness, 
public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy, 
presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of 
proof between parties. . . . The presumption of reliance employed 
in this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5 
litigation, supports, the congressional policy embodied in the 1934 
Act. In drafting that Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise 
that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted 
legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of 
those markets.100 
 
 
 96.  See supra pp. 1–3. 
 97.  Cf. GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi S.A., 927 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (dismissing the suit because the facts misrepresented did not assume importance in the 
professional trader’s investment model). 
 98.  See supra pp. 1–3. 
 99.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 100.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988). 
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Just as the dart thrower places unqualified trust in both the EMH 
and the pricing of securities his darts find, an important part of the 
indexer’s strategy is the belief that markets are sufficiently 
trustworthy so that such passive investment is consistent with the 
advisor’s fiduciary obligations.101 An investor’s presumed reliance on 
market integrity, a point repeatedly emphasized in Basic,102 is likely 
more important to passive investors than active ones. Thus, much of 
the source of Basic’s presumption of investor reliance was grounded 
in congressional intent. To be sure, the Court further supported its 
conclusion by observing that in light of studies of stock prices in well-
developed markets, “common sense and probability” further 
supported the presumption.103 But more emphasis can be placed on 
Basic’s over-arching rationale about the role presumptions should 
play in resolving disputes. 
The Roberts Court utilized presumptions, much like the Court did 
in Basic. The Roberts Court repeatedly anchors resort to a 
presumption in presumed congressional intent and the quest to 
conserve judicial resources. Though the Roberts Court’s framework is 
similar to Basic’s—congressional intent104 and judicial economies 
informed by practical realities105—the case outcomes tend to narrow 
rather than expand access to the courts. But of overriding importance 
in these decisions, as well as Basic, is congressional intent. 
Notably, Congress has not directly approved fraud on the market. 
However, its extensive reforms in the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) clearly recognized not only private 
rights of action, but also addressed a concern for causation that could 
 
 101.  See supra notes 6–7. 
 102.  See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set 
by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”). 
 103.  Id. at 246. 
 104.  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (applying the well-
established canon of statutory construction that laws are presumed not to apply 
extraterritorially); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank. Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (same); Ill. 
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (rejecting presumption of market 
power linked to patented product for antitrust cases because Congress eliminated the market 
power presumption in patent misuse cases); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 135 
(2005) (recognizing presumption of fee award in civil rights litigation, but deciding no fee award 
was appropriate for successful remand of the case to state court). 
 105.  See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010) (holding that to conserve judicial 
resources, there is a presumption of voluntariness on the part of the defendant who responds to 
questioning more than fourteen days after invoking his request for an attorney); Clark v. 
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (upholding Arizona’s rule barring mental-disease and capacity 
evidence short of insanity from offsetting evidence of mens rea). 
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only apply in open-market fraud cases such as fraud on the market 
cases. For example, the PSLRA established a procedure for selecting a 
lead plaintiff for any securities class actions106 and limits any plaintiff’s 
recovery by the mean trading price of the security within a ninety-day 
window of the truthful disclosure.107 The latter provision addresses the 
case where a material decline in a security’s price accompanies 
disclosures that the plaintiff alleges were admissions of earlier 
fraudulent reporting, but the market, on reflection, significantly 
bounces back. The reasoning being: No harm, no foul—or at least one 
having a lower impact. Minimally implicit in this provision is 
Congress’s belief that markets can overreact but are efficient over 
some period of time. Congress’s stated ninety days is somewhat 
corrective of such overreaction. The provision is also suggestive that 
Congress believes markets are noisy, a fact supported as well by 
contemporary EMH research. Congress therefore provided a means 
to address one concern for noisy markets: the ninety-day post-
corrective disclosure mean trading price as a check on volatility that 
otherwise would enhance the plaintiff’s damage claims. Seeing as this 
provision also addresses class action procedures, Congress not only 
understood that markets could be so volatile, but that the securities 
traded in such markets would be subject to class action suits that 
necessarily would be premised on fraud on the market. Hence, 
volatility and short-term corrections could be expected for securities 
subject to fraud on the market suits. 
Thus, congressional intent supportive of fraud on the market can 
easily be located and that intent remains consistent with Basic’s 
invoking a presumption of reliance where appropriate. The Supreme 
Court in both Basic and Amgen believed that central to investor 
reliance is the process by which public markets imbed financially 
significant information into stock prices.108 It is reliance, or rather trust 
in this process, that investors rely in ways that the Court believed 
 
 106.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(3) (West 2013). 
 107.  Id. § 78u-4(e). 
 108.  See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (“If 
a market is generally efficient in incorporating publicly available information into a security’s 
market price, it is reasonable to presume that a particular, public, material misrepresentation 
will be reflected in the security’s price.”); Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (“In drafting [the Exchange] 
Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by 
information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those 
markets.”); id. at 246 (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that 
the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” (footnote omitted)). 
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satisfied the reliance requirement for fraud on the market. What 
appears most consistent with the reasoning in both Basic and Amgen 
is evidence supporting the investor’s dependence on the integrity by 
which the pricing of shares occurs in the market. Certainly the classic 
investor places faith in the information relied on to trade and 
presumably this extends to faith that share prices reflect publicly 
available information. The indexer and style investor also place faith 
in the market’s pricing mechanism. Consider that each type of trader 
is most likely an institution whose investment actions are subject to 
fiduciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries of the managed funds. 
Without trust in the markets in which trades are made, the funds 
could hardly be seen to act consistent with these obligations. Clearly, 
if faith is to be found in the integrity of the stock pricing process, it 
would be among the quintessential indexed fund. Similarly, the 
modeler would not be comfortable with reliance on an algorithm if 
there was not faith that the trades directed by the equation would be 
carried out in a market whose parameters for risk, including the risk 
of misinformation, were calculated. And the dart thrower is perhaps 
the most trusting of all; the dart thrower has so much belief in the 
market to believe it is not worth second-guessing choices that fate 
would otherwise command. 
CONCLUSION 
After Amgen reliance continues to be a requirement for invoking 
fraud on the market. Despite some slight clarification of how fraud on 
the market is to be applied, the Court has not specified just what form 
reliance is to take. As developed here, the muddle was created by 
Basic’s invocation of the EMH to support what the EMH does not 
address—how investors act in an efficient market. Nor did Basic or 
Amgen provide much guidance as to what is an efficient market and 
just what “efficient” means under fraud on the market. The 
opaqueness is likely due to the serious disconnect between the EMH, 
our markets, and most particularly how investors behave. 
The path forward from this Court-created conundrum is 
straightforward enough. Because reliance is required and reliance was 
stated in Basic to be market-centric, the proof of reliance should be 
met by allegations that investors believed in the integrity of the stock 
pricing function typically provided for that security’s price. This would 
turn not on all the Cammer factors but on evidence of how that 
security’s price has generally responded to material non-public 
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information. As seen earlier, this factor dwarfs the other factors, such 
as the number of analysts, the presence of institutional investors, the 
depth of the market, etc.109 The real proof here is in observing how the 
stock’s price generally responds to information of the type alleged to 
have been omitted or misstated. This would represent an expansion of 
the availability of fraud on the market. Equally important, evidence 
that investors are indexers, modelers, or even the proverbial dart 
thrower should not result in automatic disqualification in the face of 
understanding that these positions naturally assume reliance, not 
distrust, on the integrity of the process by which stock prices are 
formed. This approach is consistent with Congress’s embrace of open-
market frauds in enacting the PSLRA. Presumptions are, of course, 
rebuttable, as Basic recognized. Basic placed its embrace on a 
presumption jointly premised on the expectations of investors 
regarding the integrity of securities markets, as well as Congress’s 
efforts to preserve their integrity. This presumption should remain an 
unchallenged bedrock for fraud on the market as an instrument of 
important public policy. 
 
 
 109.  See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
